In recent months I have become increasingly sympathetic to a certain metaethical view (dating back--on my reading of him--to Aristotle). The view raises a worry which I can at once understand, yet which strikes me as entirely confused and premature.
The view is this: for a thing to be good or valuable (I use the terms interchangeably) is for it to be good for someone or something.
Most of us don't deny the proposal that to be good-for is one way in which a thing can be good. What is radical about the proposal is that for a thing to be good-for is the only way in which a thing can be good. Many, though happy to allow that good-for is one species of goodness, still hold that there are other ways in which a thing can be good: for instance, to be good-of-a-kind (a good knife, a good person) or to be good simpliciter or absolutely (some take this view of pleasure, for instance, asserting that pleasure is just good, in and of itself and independent of whose it is).
But the good as good-for theorist excludes the latter two notions from her taxonomy of values. Good simpliciter is metaphysically troublesome (and leads to counterintuitive results, e.g., is a serial killer's pleasure good? Is a heroine addict's pleasure good?), while good-of-a-kind doesn't provide a satisfying explanation for what makes something a good x--an explanation, the good-for theorist will assert, that is better supplied by its being good for some activity, product, or individual.*
The worry I often hear when I share this view is this: the theory of good as good-for leads directly to egoism.
Truth be told, this is an objection made (sort of, but not exactly) by G. E. Moore in 1903 (see Chapter III of Principia Ethica), but I still hear it voiced today despite how obviously fallacious it is. The worry seems to proceed as follows:
(1) If something is good for someone, x, then its reason-giving force applies only to x.
(2) Therefore, if the only way in which a thing can be good is for it to be good-for someone, then the only thing each of us has reason to do is to do what is good for us, at the avoidance of altruistic behavior.
(There are, of course, omitted premises in this argument, such as that the good is reason-giving).
Now (1) seems to me to be very mistaken. We often make decisions to act in ways that benefit other people based on considerations about what would be good for them. Consider: I think it would be good for my friend if I threw him a surprise party; I think it would be good for my child if I made her eat her spinach; I think it would be good for an injured stranger on the street if I called 911. And if (2) depends on (1), (2) loses its support.
Why, then, do people so easily fall into the trap of assuming (1)? It might be a fallacy of false analogy: A is good for x; therefore, A provides reasons only for x. The analogy is false because when we say that something is good for someone, we have not yet said anything about the reasons it gives anybody to want or do anything. What we have done, rather, is made a metaphysical assertion about what constitutes the goodness: the goodness is instantiated by a relation between the good thing and a beneficiary.
It could also just be a fallacy of equivocation about the word "for", where "for" is being taken in a sense that connotes responsibility or obligation (i.e., "I have a job for you") when it should be taken in a sense that connotes the recipient of a benefit.
The bottom line is that the worry is premature: the explanation of what makes a thing good can be detached from the normative commitments that its goodness may or may not exert on someone.
*I have also been told that aesthetic value provides a counterexample to the view that all value is goodness-for, but I disagree. Good works of art, for example, enrich our lives, and, especially, the lives of those who appreciate art.
The view is this: for a thing to be good or valuable (I use the terms interchangeably) is for it to be good for someone or something.
Most of us don't deny the proposal that to be good-for is one way in which a thing can be good. What is radical about the proposal is that for a thing to be good-for is the only way in which a thing can be good. Many, though happy to allow that good-for is one species of goodness, still hold that there are other ways in which a thing can be good: for instance, to be good-of-a-kind (a good knife, a good person) or to be good simpliciter or absolutely (some take this view of pleasure, for instance, asserting that pleasure is just good, in and of itself and independent of whose it is).
But the good as good-for theorist excludes the latter two notions from her taxonomy of values. Good simpliciter is metaphysically troublesome (and leads to counterintuitive results, e.g., is a serial killer's pleasure good? Is a heroine addict's pleasure good?), while good-of-a-kind doesn't provide a satisfying explanation for what makes something a good x--an explanation, the good-for theorist will assert, that is better supplied by its being good for some activity, product, or individual.*
The worry I often hear when I share this view is this: the theory of good as good-for leads directly to egoism.
Truth be told, this is an objection made (sort of, but not exactly) by G. E. Moore in 1903 (see Chapter III of Principia Ethica), but I still hear it voiced today despite how obviously fallacious it is. The worry seems to proceed as follows:
(1) If something is good for someone, x, then its reason-giving force applies only to x.
(2) Therefore, if the only way in which a thing can be good is for it to be good-for someone, then the only thing each of us has reason to do is to do what is good for us, at the avoidance of altruistic behavior.
(There are, of course, omitted premises in this argument, such as that the good is reason-giving).
Now (1) seems to me to be very mistaken. We often make decisions to act in ways that benefit other people based on considerations about what would be good for them. Consider: I think it would be good for my friend if I threw him a surprise party; I think it would be good for my child if I made her eat her spinach; I think it would be good for an injured stranger on the street if I called 911. And if (2) depends on (1), (2) loses its support.
Why, then, do people so easily fall into the trap of assuming (1)? It might be a fallacy of false analogy: A is good for x; therefore, A provides reasons only for x. The analogy is false because when we say that something is good for someone, we have not yet said anything about the reasons it gives anybody to want or do anything. What we have done, rather, is made a metaphysical assertion about what constitutes the goodness: the goodness is instantiated by a relation between the good thing and a beneficiary.
It could also just be a fallacy of equivocation about the word "for", where "for" is being taken in a sense that connotes responsibility or obligation (i.e., "I have a job for you") when it should be taken in a sense that connotes the recipient of a benefit.
The bottom line is that the worry is premature: the explanation of what makes a thing good can be detached from the normative commitments that its goodness may or may not exert on someone.
*I have also been told that aesthetic value provides a counterexample to the view that all value is goodness-for, but I disagree. Good works of art, for example, enrich our lives, and, especially, the lives of those who appreciate art.
