In a talk I gave this evening on Aristotle's ethical theory (in which I defended him from the charge of egoism), someone raised the question of whether it would be rational to act egoistically in extreme circumstances, for instance, where I had to harm others in order to preserve my own life (e.g., suppose I have to throw someone out of a lifeboat in order to prevent it from sinking so that I and the other people on the lifeboat do not drown). The intuition at work here is that standard models of rationality dictate that we should behave egoistically in such circumstances.
(The context in which this question was raised was my proposal that Aristotle thinks our reason for any course of action should be to bring about the highest good for humans--eudaimonia, or a life of virtuous activity*--for myself and for others. This is, at least partly, a non-egoistic endeavor.)
One might be tempted to construe Aristotle's own take on this situation in the following way: the people in this scenario can't act virtuously. Rather, extreme scenarios tempt us to succumb to appetite and emotion and do things that we'd ordinarily think are vicious. Generally, virtuous behavior can't sustain itself outside circumstances in which people have sufficient access to material and social well-being.
But this isn't necessarily right. At NE I 10, Aristotle states quite clearly that virtuous behavior can persist during bouts of misfortune if the person who suffers the misfortune is already virtuous. Even when bad things happen to a virtuous person, virtuous activity “shines through”; the virtuous person “bears . . . severe misfortunes with good temper” because he is “noble and magnanimous” (1100b31-3).
Aristotle, furthermore, allows for the possibility that a virtuous person may choose to die for the sake of others. Why? Simply because courageous actions seem to him a noble (kalon) thing to do (NE IX 8, 1169a26-27). The intrinsic goodness of virtuous actions, even actions of extreme sacrifice, strikes him as a reason to choose them.
Returning to our lifeboat scenario: standard conceptions of rationality suggest that egoistic behavior is the most reasonable course of action. But I cannot help but wonder if we think this simply because they are the intuitions that we--being fallible, admittedly self-interested people--tend to have. In fairness to my interlocutor, she conceded that it is not obvious that acts of self-sacrifice would be any less rational. On the Aristotelian picture, I think it is clear that a virtuous person would not share this intuition either.
The bottom line? I am not sure how on board I am with the notion that egoism is the rational way to behave in extreme circumstances. Although it is fairly uncontroversial that most of us would behave that way, it is not obvious that we should. If we consider more carefully the kind of character that we ought to cultivate, and endeavor sincerely to do, the ordinary thought that egoistic behavior in extreme circumstances is the best course of action may lose its intuitiveness for us. Is it irrational for me to jump overboard and save everyone else on the lifeboat? If the answer is yes, it is by no means an obvious one.
References:
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. In Aristotle: Selections. Ed. and trans. Terrence Irwin and Gail Fine. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett,
1995.
*Aristotle's take on theoria, or the life of divine contemplation, raises a question about whether virtuous activity is the right answer to what he thinks the best life for a human is. I bracket that question for the purposes of this blog, suffice it to say there is little doubt in Aristotle that one who achieves theoria knows how to act virtuously. Keep in mind, also, that theoria is virtuous: the one who practices it possesses a virtue, theoretical wisdom, and possesses the other virtues as well.
*Aristotle's take on theoria, or the life of divine contemplation, raises a question about whether virtuous activity is the right answer to what he thinks the best life for a human is. I bracket that question for the purposes of this blog, suffice it to say there is little doubt in Aristotle that one who achieves theoria knows how to act virtuously. Keep in mind, also, that theoria is virtuous: the one who practices it possesses a virtue, theoretical wisdom, and possesses the other virtues as well.
